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The initial work of this project was conducted from September 2012 to December 
2012 in the Cyber Physical System Laboratory in the School of Computer Science at 
McGill University. By December 2012, we had identified a series of flaws associated 
with the design and implementation of the Facebook Like system. We reported 
these flaws to Facebook in February 2013, and expressed our intention to 
collaborate on helping fix them. The Site Integrity Team of Facebook replied in 
March 2013 acknowledging the inherently insecure design, but they need to spend 
more engineering time than research collaboration. After that, we submitted some 
of the research findings to one of the most famous convention – DEFCON, under the 
title of "Are You Really Liking It When You Use the Facebook Likes" in May 2013, 
and the paper got accepted in late June 2013. Later, because we could not go to 
present at the conference, we had to retract the paper from the conference.  
 
Over the past two years, Facebook has made continuous progress fighting with fake 
likes. Facebook released patches and improvements to the Like button API and fixed 
some of the major flaws. In the mean time, the Like button has become the de facto 
standard for the users to show their fondness of a particular online content, and 
been used as a widely-accepted metric to measure the popularity of a webpage. 
Even more interesting, it has been associated with the economic benefits and 
interests to the providers of the contents / underlying business. There are reports 
stating that a single Facebook like is worth as much as $174 to the business [1, 2]. 
 
However, we recently found that several of the flaws we discovered are still out in 
the wild. We recorded 3 demo videos to illustrate these flaws and potential threats. 
For example, these flaws could be used by online spammers to generate massive 
amount of fake Facebook Likes for profits, impeding the common interest of both 
social network users and legitimate advertisers. This may endanger the ecosystems 
on the Internet which leverages on the Facebook API. Also, we show these fake 
"likes" can be easily generated in an automatic fashion at very low cost. As another 
example, we show some of the flaws also lead to the increase of Facebook Likes even 
when legitimate users are making negative comments and expressing dislikes (or 
even disgusts) of the associated online content. These findings surprise most people.  
 
We discover that a large number of the online websites, including famous ones like 
Yahoo, abcNews, HuffingtonPost, FoxNews, ESPN, BillBoard, etc., are affected by 
these flaws. Given the fact that Facebook has become an integral part of our 
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everyday digital lives, and is the dominant online forum for social networking, these 
flaws may have potentially large negative impacts and consequences to our online 
community. We all love Facebook. We hope by making public our research findings 
together with several video demos can help raise the awareness of these flaws and 
potential consequences. We hope these efforts can contribute to the research and 
solutions of building a truthful and healthy online social ecosystem. 
 
These demos, which were recorded in March, 2015,  are available at:  
Demo 1: ​https://youtu.be/lB9KKDRQ52c 
Demo 2: ​https://youtu.be/LffXRnEzdV0 
Demo 3: ​https://youtu.be/lxcW75FKCoM 
 
[1] David Cohen, Syncapse: Each Facebook Like Is Worth $174 To Brands, retrieved 
on March, 4​th​, 2015 from 
http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/syncapse-like-174/418690 
[2]. Courtney Kettmann, Is a Facebook “Like” Worth $174? Probably Not, retrieved 
on  March, 4​th​, 2015 from 
http://www.wired.com/2013/07/is-a-facebook-like-worth-174-probably-not/ 
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ABSTRACT
Social networks help to bond people who share similar in-
terests all over the world. As a complement, the Facebook
“Like” button is an efficient tool that bonds people with the
online information. People click on the “Like” button to ex-
press their fondness of a particular piece of information and
in turn tend to visit webpages with high “Like” count. The
important fact of the Like count is that it reflects the num-
ber of actual users who “liked” this information. However,
according to our study, one can easily exploit the defects of
the “Like” button to counterfeit a high “Like” count. We
provide a proof-of-concept implementation of these exploits,
and manage to generate 100 fake Likes in 5 minutes with a
single account. We also reveal existing counterfeiting tech-
niques used by some online sellers to achieve unfair advan-
tage for promoting their products. To address this fake Like
problem, we study the varying patterns of Like count and
propose an innovative fake Like detection method based on
clustering. To evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm, we
collect the Like count history of more than 9,000 websites.
Our experiments successfully uncover 16 suspicious fake Like
buyers that show abnormal Like count increase patterns.
Keywords
Facebook, spamming, fake Like, social networks
1. INTRODUCTION
The modern society has witnessed the rapid expansion
of social networks, which connect people and deliver huge
amount of information everyday. As one of the largest so-
cial networks, Facebook has over one billion monthly active
users [11]. The Facebook “Like” button is the fundamental
mechanism to measure the popularity of certain content on
the Internet. With the popularity of Facebook, more and
more websites are integrating this button into their web-
pages. According to a statistics [5], over 3 million websites
are using this button today.
The Facebook Like button, as shown in Fig. 1, can be
embedded into essentially any webpage and appear also ex-
tensively in the Facebook website itself (e.g. a Facebook
post, a comment). The Like button has a web button and
a count number associated. The number conceptually rep-
resents the amount of Facebook users that have clicked on
the button to express their fondness of the content. Thus,
a higher number indicates that the content is more popu-
lar. Since this idea is coined, Facebook has collected more
than 1 trillion clicks from its users [11], and the Like button
becomes an important tool for online advertising [20,22].
The great success of Facebook Likes lies in the fact that
the count number can precisely represent the number of peo-
ple that like this content, thus other users could easily find
out what is popular by checking the Facebook Like num-
bers. This is also true for online advertiser. The precision
of the number enables advertisers to advertise on popular
web pages that generate more values. If the number can-
not precisely capture the popularity of the content, it will
endanger the whole Facebook ecosystem. In this paper, we
reveal the flaws in the Facebook like mechanism and show
how these deficiencies are exploited by spammers to generate
fake “Likes”.
Figure 1: An example of the Facebook Like button
According to our study, online spammers have already
been selling huge number of Facebook Likes. These Likes
are intentionally generated for unfair profits (e.g. for ad-
vertisement revenues), which will harm the Facebook com-
munity. Fig. 2 presents a search for such services on eBay,
which returns more than 3,000 results fake Like sellers. We
also find similar sales on fiverr.com and many other free-
lance websites. There are even companies particularly sell-
ing Facebook Likes, such as WeSellLikes [30] and BuyReal-
Likes [6].
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study on the
Facebook Like mechanism and reveal the flaws that are
exploited for counterfeiting likes. We present a proof-of-
concept approach, which can generate more than 20 fake
Likes per minute with only one spammer Facebook account.
To help prevent fake Likes, we propose a clustering-based
algorithm to sift out highly suspicious fake Like buyers. We
Figure 2: Facebook Like sales on eBay
use the algorithm to analyze traces of Like number fluctua-
tions of 9,000 websites. Our results, as validated by manual
inspection, effectively uncover the suspicious fake Like buy-
ers.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold:
1. We uncover the fake Like problem and reveal con-
crete exploits that can generate fake Likes quickly and
stealthily (against most known anti-spamming tech-
niques).
2. We propose a unsupervised clustering-based algorithm
to sift out highly suspicious fake Like buyers.
3. We present a real world study of 9,000 Alexa top web-
sites using our algorithm, and sucessfully detect 16 sus-
pects of fake Like buyers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates
the Like mechanism, its deficiencies and a proof-of-concept
fake Like generator; Section 3 describes our algorithm that
identifies suspects and our evaluation results; Section 4 in-
troduces related work; Finally, Section 5 concludes this pa-
per and discusses the future work.
2. FAKE LIKES
In this section, we first elaborate the Like mechanism from
Facebook. Then, we analyze and reveal potential deficien-
cies within the current design. Finally, we provide several
proof-of-concept methods to generate fake Likes by exploit-
ing these deficiencies. We also compare our methods with
existing approaches from massive spamming community.
2.1 Design of the Like button
The Facebook Like mechanism is generally used to mea-
sure and distribute the popularity of certain webpages on
the Internet. This mechanism involves interactions between
multiple parties. A website embeds the “Like” component
provided by Facebook. The “Like” component consists of a
button and a count number by its side, as shown in Fig. 1.
A user, upon visiting the webpage, can click on the button
to express fondness of the page. When the button is pressed,
it reports to Facebook with the URL of the page. Facebook
updates the count for the particular URL and next time the
page is liked (possibly by other users), the count number
will increase by one.
Besides clicking on the button, other activities related to
a URL (e.g. sharing the URL as shown in Fig. 3) on the
Facebook website will also increase the count for that page.
We will explain further in the following section.
An attacker, however, disguises as a normal user and abuses
the Like button to counterfeit lots of Likes. These so-called
fake Likes can fool normal users into believing that the web-
page has a great popularity. The attacker achieves this by
exploit the flaws in the counting scheme. We will then ex-
plain the counting scheme and then dive into the flaws.
2.2 Counting Details
2.2.1 Count Classification
As mentioned before, the web component from Facebook
contains a button and a number. Before looking into how
this number is counted, we define the following terms for
better distinguishment:
• The display count is the number shown beside the
Like button.
• The like count is the number of actual clicks on the
button. A user can only click once on the button em-
bedded for the same page. The second click will inval-
idate the first one.
• The share count represents the number of times that
this page (its URL) is shared on the Facebook website.
• The comment count represents the number of com-
ments that appear under the Facebook post that shares
the URL.
According to the official Facebook documentation [13], the
display count is stored as “total count” in the database, and
it is the sum of the other three above-mentioned counts, i.e.,
total count = share count+ like count+ comment count
(1)
In the rest of this paper, we use X-count as a general term
to refer to these counts.
2.2.2 Counting Scheme
We perform a series of experiments to reveal the effects
of various activities. The activities we looked into comprise
common activities on the Facebook website. Tab. 1 presents
the summary results. We notice that some activities are
repeatable given one user account (test 2, 4, and 6). This
provides a potential opportunity for an attacker to generate
fake Likes with only one account.
2.2.3 Deficiencies
By examining tests in Tab. 1, we summarize the following
design deficiencies which could be exploited.
Duplicated counts. As mentioned before, the second
click on the button will invalidate the first click. This sim-
ply prevents duplicated Likes. However, we found that an
attacker can create multiple posts with the same page (test
3) and share these posts for multiple times (test 4) to in-
crease the share count of the page, which in turn increases
the display count. Similarly, by adding random comments
under the post can arbitrarily increase the comment count
(test 6). These repeatable activities from the same account
will result in arbitrary increase in display count.
Lack of accountability. Facebook maintains a list of
people that like a page. Thus each like count is uniquely
Figure 3: An example of the Facebook post. Test 2 and 4
in Tab.1 correspond to click on the like and share button
above the comment area respectively.
linked to one user. Furthermore, each share count and each
comment count can link back to a share post or a comment,
respectively. This bookkeeping allows Facebook to gain ac-
countability for each count, which gives critical evidence for
defending against spamming.
However, according to test 5, deleting a post, hence the
removal of the comments belonging to it, will not result in
any reduction for share count and comment count. To con-
firm this, we first create a webpage on our own web server,
then share the page on Facebook and make random com-
ments, then immediately delete the post. The display count
is then examined everyday for a month. We also carefully
clear the web cache and try on several different machines.
We conclude that the deletion does not cause any decreasing
effect on the display count.
This deficiency essentially cripples the accountability of
share count and potentially comment count, which makes
it hard for Facebook to discover spamming posts and ac-
counts.
Irrelevant counts. According to the official Facebook
documentation [13], “a single click on the Like button will
‘like’ pieces of content on the web and share them on Face-
book”. This reflects a common user expectation, that the
display count is the number of clicks on the button, which
corresponds to like count. However, the display count
comprise not only like count but also share count and
comment count. In test 3, creating random Facebook posts
with a given URL will increase share count of that URL,
even if the posts are expressing dislikes. This is similar
for comments. Experiences of other social networks sug-
gest that, a“dislike”button can potentially distinguish these
situations and cause less confusion to users. For example,
Youtube provides such “dislike” button, Quora and Stack-
Exchange give users the “downvote” option, etc.
2.3 Generate Fake Likes
We give several proof-of-concept methods to exploit re-
vealed deficiencies to generate fake Likes. By combining
and extending these basic generating methods, the attacker
can produce massive fake Likes efficiently.
2.3.1 Pre-requisite
In the following demonstration, we only register one Face-
book account to generate fake likes. We generate a simple
webpage on our web server with a Like component from
Facebook. The webpage can be replaced by any other web-
pages on the Internet.
2.3.2 Facebook’s Anti-spamming
In designing a practical and automated spamming method,
we need to understand the anti-spamming mechanisms. We
identify the following mechanisms that could affect fake like
generation:
Post spam filter. The post spam filter will detect posts
or comments with identical content and remove them. Fur-
thermore, based on the accountability, an account that gen-
erates such duplicated posts or comments will be labeled as
spammer and also removed.
Rate control. Facebook provides open APIs, which can
be used to create, delete and manipulate posts and com-
ments. Any automated fake like generation needs to utilizes
these APIs. However, these APIs have rate control, which
limits both the frequency and the quantity of API requests.
A user that always exceeds the rate control could be labeled
as spammer and removed. Yet, an attacker can learn this
control policy with several dry runs.
2.3.3 Efficient Fake Liking
Based on the deficiencies we revealed, we repeat the below
four operations to generate fake likes.
1. Create a Facebook post with the target URL.
2. Share the post just created.
3. Add a comment to the post with arbitrary commenting
content.
4. Delete the post.
This procedure can generate three fake likes a time 1. By
repeating it, we manage to generate 20 fake likes per minute
(without violating Facebook’s rate limit). Also, we delete
the post just created to break the accountability, which dis-
ables Facebook’s spam filter effectively and makes the gen-
eration stealthy. We achieve these with only one account.
We expect that with more accounts, the generation process
could be done much faster. The code is implemented with
public Facebook API with 20 lines of python code.
2.3.4 Alternative Spamming Methods
We compare our fake like generation process with some
well-understood spamming techniques.
Visual deception. These approaches [16] simply replace
the Facebook component with a fake image or overlay an
high count image over the real display count. These ap-
proaches cannot cheat users redirected from Facebook (since
the display count is kept in the Facebook database). Also,
these replaced static image cannot response to the user clicks.
Spamming accounts. These methods [4] require a large
number of zombie accounts and generate one Like per ac-
count, similarly to “bot-net” attacks. These approaches rely
on a method to register a large set of zombie accounts, which
could be time consuming. Also, these spamming accounts
1As in March, 2015, this procedure now only generates two
likes, because Facebook has removed the flaw which makes
creating a post with the target URL generate one Like.
Table 1: Tests and corresponding effects on Facebook Likes
Tests Effects
No. Details like count share count comment count
1 click the Like button on the test page +1 0 0
2 click the Like button on a post1 +1 0 0
3 create a post with target URL (repeatable2) 0 +1 4 0
4 share the post with target URL (repeatable2) 0 +1 0
5 delete a post with target URL3 0 0 0
6 add a random comment to the post (repeatable2) 0 0 +1
7 delete a comment on the post 0 0 -1
1 All the posts referred in this table are Facebook posts sharing the target test page’s URL address with random
words.
2 The test is exactly repeatable, thus will lead to duplicate Likes.
3 To ensure that the all-zero effect of this test is not due to any network cache or delayed update in the Facebook
database, the effects have been validated each day for one month after the post being deleted.
4 As tested in March 2015, this effect has been disabled by Facebook, and now it should be 0.
can be easily detected and removed by the spam filter, with
a lot of well studied anti-spamming methods [4,8, 27].
Compared to existing spamming methods, our method has
the following advantages:
• Single account.
Our approach does not need to maintain a pool of
zombie accounts, which saves lots of costs and time.
Nevertheless, if the attacker does have multiple zom-
bie accounts, they can be used in parallel to speedup
the fake Like generation at ease.
• Easy to implement.
The generation process needs only 20 lines of code to
complete the attack and is fully automated. With only
a small number of zombie accounts, our approach can
effectively generate hundreds of fake Like per minute.
• Anti-anti-spamming.
Our approach breaks the accountability of the Face-
book services and carefully obeys rate control policy.
Preventing spams without accountability is difficult.
Thus our approach can operate stealthily without any
direct evidences in the Facebook system.
• Actual spamming.
Unlike visual deception, our approach places actual
changes of the display count in Facebook database.
Thus, even a normal Facebook user can view a high
display count of the target URL.
2.4 Threat assessment
Before the submission of this paper, we have reported and
confirmed these deficiencies with Facebook. In response,
Facebook released a few patches to the Like mechanism
to eliminate some of the deficiencies we mentioned. How-
ever, our investigation shows that some of these deficiencies
still persist and widely impact websites which use the Face-
book Like button. As in March 2015, a list by the company
BuiltWith counts over 3 million websites that use Facebook
Like button [5]. We further look into the Alexa top site list
and find that potential victims include popular websites such
as CNN, ABC News, The Huffington Post, The Economist,
ESPN, Billboard, etc. Given the wide coverage and large
reader population of these websites, we believe the flaws of
the Facebook Like button is potentially a large threat to the
health of the Facebook ecosystem.
3. SPOT THE FAKE LIKE BUYERS
In this section, we dig out the suspicious fake Like buyers
by exploring the abnormality in the historical Like counts of
real world websites. The basic idea is: First, record the his-
torical tracks of different counts of selected websites over an
observation period; second, extract “meaningful” segments,
and cluster them into different patterns; third, employ these
patterns as the features to cluster the websites; finally, spot
the suspicious websites by analyzing the clusters. Before get-
ting into the details of data processing, we briefly introduce
the clustering algorithms being used.
3.1 Data set
The historical display counts of 9,000 websites are moni-
tored over 53 days, spanning from Nov. 10, 2012 to Jan. 1,
2013. These websites are picked from Alexa top 1 million
sites [1] ranked on Nov. 5, 2012. Among them, 2,000 are
picked from the top, 2,000 from the middle, and the rest
5,000 from the tail of the 1 million sites. They are referred
to as the top, the middle and the tail sites hereafter. Such a
picking scheme ensures that the data set comprises different
kinds of websites. Intuitively, the websites closer to the top
are larger websites with large traffic and are known by more
people, they have weaker incentive to buy fake Likes. In con-
trast, the tail websites have less traffic and are known by less
people, thus they have stronger incentive to buy fake Likes
and less concern about the risk of their reputation. That is
the reason for picking more (i.e., 5,000) websites from the
tail of the list.
All details of the display count, i.e. share count, like
count, comment count and total count, are crawled from
Facebook using the graph API. The crawling period is set
to 12 hours, i.e. two samples are crawled each day, at noon
and midnight respectively. In the end, each website has four
count tracks, with 106 entries per track.
3.2 Data preprocessing
3.2.1 Remove unchanged tracks
If a track is never changed, it can neither convey any in-
formation about normal website activities, nor represent any
potential Like buying behaviors. Thus we remove them from
the data set at the first step.
3.2.2 Convert to the ratio track (normalization)
The crawled websites have a large variance in the base
number of X-count. Thus it is meaningless to directly com-
pare their counts with each other. For example, for a website
with 1 million like count, an increment of 1,000 is prob-
ably a normal case. But for a website with only 100 like
count, such an increment is definitely suspicious. To ex-
clude the influence of different base number and make the
counts across websites comparable, the absolute numbers in
the count track are normalized as follows.
For a certain kind of count, the number at the beginning of
the observation is denoted as a, and that in the end as b.
Then the absolute change during the observation period is
|b−a|. Furthermore, if we denote the ith record in the track
as ni, the variance ratio upon ni being crawled is defined as:
vi =
 0 i = 1;ni − ni−1|b− a| i = 2, 3, . . . , len
and len is the length of the track. vi reflects how much a cer-
tain sample period has contributed to the increment through
the whole observation. Notice that the crawled counts are
not monotonically increasing over time, thus it is possible
that vi is negative or has an absolute value larger than 100%.
Fig. 4a illustrates the variance ratio track of share count
for facebook.com .
After this step, each website has four ratio tracks, which
store the variance ratio of share count, like count, com-
ment count and total count respectively over the observa-
tion period.
3.3 Detect suspicious websites
After preprocessing the crawled data, we can start the
process of clustering the websites. In this subsection, we
first give the basic assumptions, and then elaborate upon
how the websites are clustered.
3.3.1 Assumptions
According to the observations of the data set and the real
world experience, we make the following assumptions before
clustering the websites.
Assumption 1. Within each ratio track, at most L con-
secutive points are related.
The physical interpretation of the data point in the ratio
track is how much the X-count has increased over the last
time it being crawled. In real life, the X-count changes
in a bubbling fashion: Sometimes the website is promoted
by special events, for example, advertised by a celebrity or
famous blog, then it gets high increasing ratios for a period,
which causes a“bubble”. For other time, the variance ratio is
stable with minor fluctuations. The time span of the largest
bubble defines L. In this paper, we choose L to be 5, based
on the observation that most Like sales on eBay promise to
take effect within 48 hours, given that our crawling period
is 12 hours.
Assumption 2. For any two different websites, their ra-
tio tracks are independent from each other.
There may exist a few cases against this assumption. For
example, A and B are websites holding similar content and
B has embedded a promotion link of A on its homepage. It
is possible that when B gets a significant increase of Likes,
the same group of users also visit A and give A Likes. In
this case, display count of A and B are not strictly indepen-
dent. Considering this case, we analyze the source code of
the monitored websites for promotion links of each other,
and find it to be extremely rare. We conclude that this as-
sumption holds in general and are reasonable for the work
in this paper.
Assumption 3. Most of the websites never buy fake Likes.
This assumption is easy to understand according to the basic
rule called “presumption of innocence” in Social Science.
Assumption 4. Top sites are less likely to buy fake Likes.
We mentioned before that the top sites have larger traf-
fic and are well advertised over the tail sites. They have
more concern about the reputation and smaller needs for
fake Likes.
3.3.2 Extract the website features
According to our observation, the Like count changes of
the websites are event-driven. Various real world events,
such as festivals, promotions, media reports, etc., lead to
the big rises and falls in the recorded ratio tracks. Each
event corresponds to a segment of the track comprising a
few consecutive ratio points. Segments are independent from
each other. Between these segments, the variance ratio are
relatively stable with small variances. These segments give
hint about the changing patterns of Like counts, thus can
be used as the features of websites.
Abnormal segments.
To this end, our first goal is to split the ratio track into in-
dependent segments. According to Assumption 1, the max-
imal length of the segment is L. To find out the delimiting
positions between different segments in the ratio track, We
introduce the abnormality filter band. We take the ratio
track of facebook.com to illustrate how it works (Fig. 4).
Denote the ratio track of facebook.com as Tr. The center
line of the filter band is the average of Tr (denoted as µ(Tr),
the red dot line in the middle of Fig. 4a); the width of the
filter band is twice the standard deviation of Tr (denoted
as σ(Tr)); the upper border and lower border of the filter
band are µ(Tr)+σ(Tr) and µ(Tr)−σ(Tr), and correspond to
the upper and lower red dot line in Fig. 4a respectively. The
filter band confines the“normal zone”of a website. Changing
ratios beyond this zone, either higher or lower, are likely to
represent real world events.
Then we impose this filter band upon the ratio track. For
points fall inside this band (eg. A1) or right on the border
(eg. A2), we replace them with 0; for points fall outside
the band (eg. B1 and B2), we keep them unchanged. After
this step, a few consecutive non-zero sequences separated
by zero are produced (Fig. 4b). Because they are comprised
of points out of the “normal zone”, we denote them as the
abnormal segments.
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Figure 4: An example of extracting abnormal segments by applying the filter band.
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of clustering abnormal segment. Higher CH-index indicates
better clustering result.
Feature vector.
By far, each website can be represented by a set of abnor-
mal segments. Intuitively, a website is apt to have a response
pattern to a category of events rather than a particular one.
Correspondingly, these patterns are better expressed by cat-
egories of segments than individual ones. Therefore we clus-
ter all the segments across different websites into different
categories.
The abnormal segments acquired are aligned to the same
length for clustering. According to Assumption 1, the aligned
length is set to L, which is 5. The aligning process is as fol-
lows.
• For an abnormal segment shorter than 5, the points
preceding and following it in the ratio track are con-
catenated symmetrically to it, extending the length to
5. If this extension cannot be accomplished symmetri-
cally, the preceding points are concatenated first.
• For an abnormal segment longer than 5, they are it-
eratively split into two parts at the lowest point until
every new part’s length is shorter than or equal to 5.
Then the new parts shorter than 5 are extended as
aforementioned.
After the alignment, the segments are clustered using K-
medoids algorithm. The best number of clusters for each
X-count is decided by the CH-method detailed in the next
subsection. Fig. 5 illustrates which number of clusters works
best. As a result, the share count, like count, comment
count and total count are clustered into 4, 3, 2 and 2 cat-
egories, respectively. These 11 categories together constitute
the feature vector of the websites. Each entry of the vector
stores how many segments belonging to that category the
website has.
3.3.3 Clustering algorithm
Without prior knowledge about the fake Like buyers, we
are confronted with an unsupervised clustering problem. To
solve this kind of problem, K-medoids and K-means are
the most extensively applied algorithms. In contrast to K-
means, K-medoids picks the medoid instead of the mean-
value point as the cluster centroid in each iteration, and
updates the new centroid by calculating pair-wise dissimi-
larity rather than using mean-value point of the intermediate
clusters. Therefore, K-medoids is less sensitive to noises and
outliers. In this paper, we choose the K-medoids algorithm.
When applying unsupervised clustering algorithm like K-
medoids, an common problem is how to determine the best
number of clusters. There are many techniques to address
this problem [7, 18, 19, 25, 26]. In this paper, we choose the
CH method, which is proposed by Calinski and Harabasz
[7]. It is regarded as one of the most efficient techniques for
determining the number of clusters [12]. The process goes
as follows.
1. For a specific number of clusters K, cluster the data
with a certain algorithm (K-medoids in our case). Then
define two matrices SSW (within-cluster scatter ma-
trix) and SSB (between-cluster scatter matrix) as fol-
lows,
SSWK =
K∑
i=1
∑
x∈Ci
(x−mi)(x−mi)⊤
SSBK =
K∑
i=1
Ni(mi −m)(mi −m)⊤
where Ci is the ith cluster; mi is the center of Ci; Ni
is the number of points in Ci; m is the mean value of
all points in the data set.
2. When having K clusters, the CH-index is defined as,
CHK =
trace(SSBK)/(K − 1)
trace(SSWK)/(N −K)
whereN =
∑K
i=1Ni is the total number of data points.
Here the numerator describes the dispersion between
the clusters, and the larger it is, the further differ-
ent clusters are from each other. This means that
the difference between these clusters are more obvious.
In contrast, the denominator describes the dispersion
within each cluster, and the smaller it is, the closer
each element is to others in the same cluster. This
indicates higher similarity among elements within the
same cluster. Put them together, higher CH-index
indicates a better clustering result.
3. Finally, find the best number of clusters, which is Kˆ,
the solution of the following optimization problem,
Kˆ = argmax
K
CHK , K ≥ 2
3.3.4 Clustering result
After the previous steps, each website can be represented
by a 11-dimension feature vector. We notice that there are
a lot of websites having all-zero feature vectors. These web-
sites have no changes in either of the four counts during the
observation period. Thus they can be confirmed as benign
websites that never bought fake Likes. After excluding them,
3,483 websites remain to be clustered. The composition of
these websites are given in Tab. 2.
By applying the CH-method, the best number of clusters
is found to be 4 (Fig. 6). The clustered result is shown in
Tab. 3.
Table 2: Composition of websites being clustered
Groups Top Middle Tail
Size 1546 637 1300
Percentage(%) 44.8 18.3 37.3
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Figure 6: The variance of CH-index over cluster number K
of clustering the websites. Higher CH-index indicates better
clustering result.
Table 3: Clusters of websites
Clusters 1 2 3 4
Size 655 1443 69 1316
Percentage(%) 18.8 41.4 2.0 37.8
3.4 Result analysis
According to Assumption 4, the top websites are less likely
to buy fake Likes. Thus they can be used to identify the
benign clusters. Denote the set of 3,483 clustered websites
asW , we are interested in how they distribute over different
clusters. We define the following three ratios to ease the
analysis of the clustering result.
Given a set Jn, which comprises the first n websites from
either the top, the middle or the tail group, the inner-cluster
ratio over cluster C is,
IJn,C =
|Jn ∩ C|
|Jn ∩W |
Here, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
The inter-cluster ratio O is,
OC =
|C|
|W |
The tendency ratio R is defined as,
RJn,C =
IJn,C
OC
RJn,C reflects the tendency of the websites from set Jn
appearing in cluster C. If the websites are uniformly dis-
tributed over the clusters, RJn,C will always be 1 for any C
and Jn. The larger RJn,C is, the more likely a website from
set Jn appears in cluster C.
3.4.1 Observations
Fig. 7 gives details about how the tendency ratio changes
with different n, clusters and website groups. Each subfigure
corresponds to one website group. From these figures, the
following observations are made.
• Cluster 3 has the smallest tendency ratio for the top
websites and largest tendency ratio for the tail web-
sites. Particularly, none of the first 200 top websites
appears in this cluster. Also, Cluster 3 has the small-
est size (Tab. 3). According to Assumption 3 and 4,
cluster 3 are most Likely to be the suspects of fake
Like buyers.
• Cluster 4 has a dominant tendency ratio for the top
websites. Besides, the leading sites (smaller n) in the
top group correspond to a much higher tendency ratio
than the rest ones. For example, for the first 200 top
sites, a stable tendency ratio over 2 can be observed.
Furthermore, it has the smallest tendency ratio over
both the middle and tail sites. According to Assump-
tion 4, cluster 4 is the most likely to be of benign
websites.
• Cluster 1 and 2 come in between. Though the ten-
dency ratios of cluster 1 for roughly the 50 leading
sites in top group are zero, as n increases, it quickly
stabilizes at around 0.8, a higher level than cluster 2
and 3. Besides, its tendency ratios over both middle
and tail sites are close to 1. Thus its elements can be
treated as benign sites with high confidence. For clus-
ter 2, its tendency ratio over the top and tail groups
are only slightly better than cluster 3. However, we
regard it as benign sites, for two reasons. First, it is
the largest cluster comprising over 40% of the websites
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Figure 7: The tendency ratio RJn,C (y-axis) of each cluster C over the website set Jn. The set Jn comprises the first n
(x-axis) websites from either the top, the middle or the tail group. If all the groups are uniformly distributed over different
clusters, RJn,C will always be 1. Higher RJn,C indicates that the websites from set Jn are more likely to appear in cluster C.
being clustered. If it is the suspect cluster, Assump-
tion 3 will be false. Second, its tendency ratio over the
middle and tail sites are consistent, this characteristic
is more like cluster 1 rather than cluster 3, and implies
that the tail sites are not special within the cluster.
As a result, we conclude websites in cluster 3 to be suspects
of fake Like buyers and those in cluster 4 to be confident
benign websites.
3.4.2 Patterns of the websites
We manually inspect into the ratio tracks of both the sus-
picious and benign websites, and summarize the following
patterns. Fig. 8 gives three websites’ ratio tracks for illus-
tration.
For the suspects of fake Like buyers:
• For most of the time, the curve of variance ratio stays
stable at 0, which means no new Likes are generated
at all.
• At some time point, the curve soars up and reaches
a high ratio and then falls back dramatically, which
forms a narrow spike in the graph. These spikes indi-
cate potential fake Like generations.
On the contrary, for the benign websites:
• The ratio track keeps oscillating over time. These os-
cillations represent the daily changes of Likes at the
normal level.
• At most of the time, the variance ratio is a small value
above zero. Although there are peaks and valleys, they
stay in a reasonable range.
3.5 Validation
First, we manually check the ratio tracks of the suspects
and confirm that all of them express the characteristics afore-
mentioned.
Second, to exclude the possibility that the high variance
ratio is caused by small base number of X-count, we investi-
gate the base number of counts for all the websites, which is
listed in Tab. 4. From this table, we conclude that over 80%
of the websites have the X-count smaller than 300. Thus,
if a website has an absolute change larger than 300 in X-
count for two consecutive records, it is reasonable to detect
it as suspicious. We apply this “larger-than-300” constraint
to the suspects in cluster 3 and have 16 of them remained.
These 16 websites are highly suspicious and are regarded as
our final detections of fake Like buyers. Specifically, the two
suspects illustrated in Fig. 8 are among the 16.
Table 4: Base X-count of different websites
Percent of websites (%) 50 80 90 100
share count ≤ 5 128 1,211 3,064,140
like count ≤ 1 82 665 19,991,431
comment count ≤ 0 56 517 1,125,401
total count ≤ 8 291 2,694 20,078,074
An alternative method is to look into the website’s traffic
to get an idea about whether the suspects had a dramatical
uprise of traffic during the time period that they got an ex-
plosion in display count. However, this alternative method
is not available directly, because the accurate traffic is con-
fidential data of the websites that we as researchers can not
access, and for those third party companies that provide es-
timated traffic data, such as Alexa, Compete, QuanteCast,
etc., their estimation is not quite accurate. In some cases,
the estimation can even have a bias off the real data for
2000% [9].
4. RELATEDWORK
Detecting cheatings, fake accounts and spammers have
been hot topics for years, due to the popularity and widely
concern related to social networks. However, not much work
related to the fake Likes exist. There are mainly two rea-
sons: first, most researchers are not aware of the fake Like
phenomenom and the black market behind it; second, it is
difficult to obtain the ground truth about which Likes are
fake and which websites are fake Like buyers. In this section,
we elaborate upon the related research from two aspects.
4.1 Like button and the user privacy
As a platform for users to post daily updates, chat with
real-world friends, share their geometrical locations, social
networks involve much more private information than any
other kind of traditional Internet services. Researchers have
always been interested in how the social network compa-
nies handle these private information. A. Roosendaal first
reveals that Facebook is tracking and tracing user informa-
tion using the Like button and cookies behind it, and reaches
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Figure 8: Ratio track over the crawling period of two suspects (a&b) and one benign website (c).
far beyond the Facebook platform to almost the whole In-
ternet [21]. C. Wills and C. Tatar investigated how Google
and Facebook employ the users’ information to target the
ads [31]. They observe that, if Facebook Like button is
used by the users to express their interest, Facebook appears
to target users with sensitive ads based on these interests.
These works suggest that the Facebook Like related data
are widely adopted for commercial use, which stimulate the
needs of fake Likes.
4.2 Detect the fake accounts and spammers
With the rapid growth of social networks (e.g. Twitter,
Facebook, Google+), the problem of detecting fake accounts
is becoming a hot topic. Fake accounts and fake Likes both
abuse the social networks for profits, and have intrinsic sim-
ilarities in terms of spamming. Many techniques have been
proposed to address this kind of problem.
Analyzing the user profiles is a major approach uti-
lized by researchers. According to the official website of
Facebook, there are at least ten ways to detect fake Face-
book accounts by analyzing the user profile [23]. Similar ap-
proaches are applied to Twitter [3,17,28]. These approaches
include checking the existence of the profile photo, inves-
tigating friend list (i.e., followers/followings), etc. These
methods are easy to understand and implement, but when
it comes to the fake Like problem, where these extra infor-
mation is absent, they are not applicable anymore. H. Gao
et al. focus on the spam of wall posts in Facebook [14], and
manage to locate the spammers and characteristics. How-
ever, all these work are trying to fight against fake/spam
accounts, which cannot directly apply to our problem, be-
cause the intrinsic differences between fake Like buyers and
spammers. Rather than spreading any spams or taking haz-
ardous actions towards other users, the fake Like buyers are
hiding in the dark and stimulating the spammers and fake
account owners to do so, and then benefit from these mali-
cious behaviours. Thus they are not likely to be detected by
utilizing the same methods of detecting fake/spam accounts.
Machine learning algorithms also play an important
role in detecting fake accounts and spammers. For instance,
SVM [3, 10, 15] are used for spammer detection on Twitter,
and Naive Bayes [2] classification algorithms were used for
email spam categorization. These choices are made because
it is assumed that obtaining the ground truth is easy, with
the help of a human being. However, this assumption no
longer holds in the case of fake Like detection. Due to the
lack of related information, even a human being cannot tell
a real Like from a fake Like or a benign website from a fake
Like buyer. That’s also the reason that we choose unsuper-
vised learning method in our work, taking use of K-medoids
algorithm.
Honeypot is another strategy widely used to detect spam-
mers [15, 24, 29] on social networks. The idea of honeypot
is straightforward: the researchers first analyze the targets
which are attractive to the spammers, and extract the com-
mon features of these targets; then they use these features
to setup bait profiles, which will attract the spammers to
attack. These profiles are the “honey”; finally, they release
these “honey” profiles to public, then lure and capture the
spammers. The challenging part of applying the honeypot
strategy to the fake Like problem is, the actual buyers are
hidden behind the fake Like spammers. Even if we success-
fully catch the spammers, it will be difficult to distinguish
whether they are randomly spamming or paid to do so.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we conducted extensive research on the
Facebook Likes. We demonstrated that the design and im-
plementation of the Facebook Like not only violated the nat-
ural meaning of “like” but also left behind deficiencies that
can be utilized to generate fake Likes. We discussed possible
ways to generate fake Likes and as an example, successfully
generated 100 fake Likes within 5 minutes, using a single
account. By applying K-medoids clustering, we found out
suspects of fake buyers from the real data set crawled from
Facebook, and concluded the basic characteristics of these
suspects.
Our work leads to many interesting yet promising re-
search topics. After figuring out possible fake Like gener-
ating methods and finding out potential fake Like buyers,
how to locate and eliminate these fake Likes remains an
open question. As we suggested, a desgin with full account-
ability is a potential solution. Besides, it is also necessary to
dig out how and how much a website may benefit from fake
Likes to help achieve a better understanding of the fake Like
black market. Furthermore, other social networks also have
similar features, such as “+1” of Google+, and “retweet” for
Twitter. A research on these features may be compared to
our current work to get a comprehensive understanding of
this kind of problems in social networks. We leave these
topics as future work.
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